In September 1970, Salvador Allende won Chile's presidential election. President Nixon ordered the CIA to prevent him from taking office — even without State Department or Pentagon knowledge. The resulting operation, Track II, funded right-wing military conspirators who attempted to kidnap Army Commander-in-Chief René Schneider, a constitutionalist who refused to support a coup. On October 22, 1970, Schneider was shot during the kidnapping attempt. He died three days later. The murder backfired catastrophically: the military rallied behind constitutional succession, and Allende was inaugurated on November 3. This investigation documents the planning, funding, weapons transfers, and aftermath of an assassination that accomplished the opposite of its goal.
On September 4, 1970, Salvador Allende won Chile's presidential election with 36.3% of the vote in a three-way race. The conservative candidate Jorge Alessandri received 34.9%, and the Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic received 27.8%. Under Chilean constitutional law, because no candidate achieved an absolute majority, the final decision would be made by a joint session of the Chilean Congress, which would choose between the top two finishers. Constitutional precedent dating to 1946 dictated that Congress would select the plurality winner — in this case, Allende.
The ratification vote was scheduled for October 24, 1970. Between the election and that date, Chile had a unique window of political vulnerability. The President-elect had no constitutional authority yet. The outgoing president, Eduardo Frei, remained in office but could not run for reelection. And the Chilean military, with its tradition of constitutional professionalism, held the ultimate power to determine whether the democratic process would continue.
Standing in the way of any military solution was one man: General René Schneider Chereau, Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army. Schneider had made his position unambiguous. The military would respect the constitutional process. It would not intervene to prevent Allende from taking office if Congress ratified the election. For anyone planning a coup, Schneider was not just an obstacle — he was the obstacle.
President Richard Nixon received news of Allende's victory with alarm. Chile represented the first democratic election of a Marxist president in the Western Hemisphere. Nixon viewed it as a potential domino that could trigger leftist victories across Latin America. On September 15, 1970 — eleven days after the election — Nixon convened a meeting in the Oval Office with CIA Director Richard Helms, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and Attorney General John Mitchell.
What happened in that meeting would not be publicly known for five years, until the Church Committee investigations forced declassification of Helms's handwritten notes. Those notes documented Nixon's direct orders in fragmentary phrases that revealed presidential intent:
"One in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile! ... not concerned risks involved ... no involvement of embassy ... $10,000,000 available, more if necessary ... make the economy scream"
Richard Helms's handwritten notes — Meeting with President Nixon, September 15, 1970Nixon's directive launched two parallel operations. Track I was the official policy: diplomatic pressure, economic warfare, propaganda operations, and support for anti-Allende political parties. Track I was coordinated through normal State Department and NSC channels and was known to US Ambassador Edward Korry. The budget for Track I political operations was $1 million, authorized by the 40 Committee — the NSC subgroup responsible for approving covert actions.
Track II was different. It was a direct order from Nixon to the CIA to foment a military coup. It was to be conducted without informing the State Department, the Defense Department, the US Ambassador to Chile, or even the 40 Committee. Track II was a presidential directive operating outside normal policy channels, reporting directly from CIA headquarters to the White House. Its goal was explicit: prevent Allende from taking office by creating conditions for military intervention.
General René Schneider had been appointed Army Commander-in-Chief in October 1969 by President Frei. He had spent his career in the Chilean Army and had a reputation for strict adherence to military professionalism and constitutional order. His position became known as the "Schneider Doctrine": the military's role was to defend the constitution and obey the civilian government, regardless of political ideology.
In the weeks after Allende's election, Schneider made his position clear in public statements and private meetings with other military officers. The Army would respect the congressional ratification process. If Congress chose Allende, the military would recognize him as the legitimate president. This was not negotiable.
For coup plotters, this created a tactical problem. A military coup without the Army Commander-in-Chief was nearly impossible. The Army controlled the bulk of Chile's military forces, the weapons depots, and the strategic positions around Santiago. A successful coup required either Schneider's participation — which he had ruled out — or his removal.
Two separate conspiracies emerged among Chilean military officers and right-wing civilians, both aimed at removing Schneider and triggering a coup. The first centered on retired General Roberto Viaux, who had led a failed military rebellion in 1969 and still had contacts within active-duty units. The second was organized by General Camilo Valenzuela, an active-duty officer who commanded a division in Santiago and had better operational capability.
CIA Santiago Station Chief Henry Hecksher made contact with both conspiracy groups in late September 1970. The CIA's operational goal was to assess their capabilities, provide encouragement, and determine whether they could successfully execute a coup. The Agency's analysis concluded that Schneider's removal was a prerequisite for any military action. The CIA did not need to suggest this — the Chilean conspirators understood it themselves.
According to later declassified cables and Church Committee testimony, the CIA provided direct material support to the conspirators. The support took three forms: intelligence about Schneider's movements and security, tactical advice about coup execution, and weapons and cash.
The CIA initially focused on Viaux's group. Viaux had a romantic appeal to the Agency — he was a fiery anti-communist with connections to extremist groups and a willingness to take action. But by mid-October, CIA headquarters became concerned. Cable traffic between Santiago Station and Langley revealed doubts about Viaux's operational competence and the risk that his group would bungle an attempt, creating a backlash that would strengthen Allende.
On October 16, 1970, CIA headquarters sent a cable to Santiago Station ordering the withdrawal of support from Viaux. The cable stated that Viaux's plotting should be discouraged and that the Agency should focus on more professional alternatives. But weapons previously provided to Viaux's network — three submachine guns and ammunition — were not retrieved.
General Camilo Valenzuela's conspiracy was considered more viable. Valenzuela was an active-duty officer with direct command authority over troops. His plan was to kidnap Schneider, place him on a plane to Argentina, and create a power vacuum that would justify military intervention. The stated logic was that Schneider's disappearance would precipitate a constitutional crisis, Frei would be unable to maintain order, and the military would step in to stabilize the situation.
The CIA maintained active contact with Valenzuela's group even after officially withdrawing support from Viaux. On October 19, 1970 — three days before Schneider's murder — Santiago Station delivered $50,000 in cash and three submachine guns with ammunition to Valenzuela's conspirators. The weapons were described as "sterile" — untraceable, with serial numbers removed.
CIA cables from October 19 and 20 documented that Valenzuela's group made at least two unsuccessful attempts to intercept Schneider. The first attempt failed when Schneider changed his route. The second attempt failed when security was tighter than expected. Each failed attempt increased the operational risk and the pressure to act before the October 24 congressional vote.
On the morning of October 22, 1970, General René Schneider left his home in the Las Condes neighborhood of Santiago and was driven to military headquarters in his official car. At approximately 8:00 AM, on a residential street, armed men in two vehicles blocked the path of Schneider's car.
Contemporary accounts from witnesses and later judicial investigations reconstructed the attack. The assailants approached Schneider's vehicle with weapons drawn. Schneider, recognizing that he was being attacked, drew his own pistol and attempted to defend himself. The attackers opened fire with submachine guns. Schneider was hit multiple times in the abdomen and chest. His driver was wounded but survived. The attackers fled in their vehicles.
Schneider was rushed to the Military Hospital in Santiago, where surgeons operated to remove bullets and repair internal damage. He survived the surgery and remained in intensive care for three days. On October 25, 1970, at 8:45 AM, General René Schneider died from complications related to his wounds. He was 56 years old.
The murder investigation immediately focused on identifying the attackers and their weapons. Ballistics analysis of shell casings recovered from the scene showed they matched the ammunition type provided by the CIA to the conspirators. The weapons used in the attack were later identified as three submachine guns consistent with those delivered by Santiago Station on October 19.
The conspirators expected Schneider's removal to create chaos and justify military intervention. The opposite happened. Schneider's death unified Chile behind constitutional succession. His military colleagues, rather than seeing his kidnapping and death as an excuse for a coup, viewed it as an attack on the institution of the military and on constitutional order itself.
Schneider's funeral became a massive public demonstration. An estimated 100,000 people attended. Military officers publicly reaffirmed their commitment to the Schneider Doctrine. President Frei addressed the nation and called for calm and respect for the constitutional process. The Chilean Congress, rather than being intimidated, accelerated its timeline.
Salvador Allende was inaugurated as President of Chile on November 3, 1970. In his inaugural address, he paid tribute to General Schneider and affirmed that his government would respect constitutional norms and the independence of the military. The CIA's Track II operation had failed completely. Not only had it failed to prevent Allende from taking office — it had strengthened his political position by creating a national rallying point for constitutional order.
For five years, Track II remained classified. US officials, when asked about Chile, referred only to Track I political operations. The existence of the parallel military coup track, the weapon deliveries, and Nixon's September 15 directive were state secrets. Ambassador Korry, who had implemented Track I in good faith, learned about Track II only after Schneider's death when he read intelligence reports describing CIA contacts with coup plotters. He felt betrayed and testified later that conducting a parallel covert operation without the ambassador's knowledge was operationally reckless.
In 1975, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities — chaired by Senator Frank Church of Idaho — launched a comprehensive investigation into CIA covert operations. The Church Committee obtained presidential authorization to review classified files related to Chile, including the full Track II operational history.
The committee's investigators uncovered Richard Helms's handwritten notes from the September 15, 1970 meeting with Nixon. They obtained CIA cables documenting the weapon deliveries to Viaux and Valenzuela. They reviewed after-action reports describing the failed kidnapping attempts and the CIA's reaction to Schneider's death. They interviewed key participants including Helms, Kissinger, Korry, and Hecksher.
"The CIA was aware of the coup plotting, had been in contact with the plotters, and — as subsequently acknowledged by the CIA — had played an active role in setting the stage for the coup attempt"
US Senate Select Committee — Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973, December 18, 1975The Church Committee's final report on Chile, published on December 18, 1975, was a landmark in congressional oversight of intelligence activities. It concluded that the CIA had not ordered Schneider's murder and that the Agency had officially withdrawn support from Viaux before the October 22 attack. However, the committee found that CIA actions created the conditions that led to Schneider's death: by providing weapons and funding to coup plotters, by encouraging them to remove Schneider, and by failing to retrieve weapons when support was officially withdrawn.
The report also documented that Track II had been conducted with explicit presidential authorization but without congressional notification or oversight — a direct violation of the CIA's charter requirement to keep Congress informed of covert operations. The Chile case became the primary justification for establishing permanent Senate and House intelligence committees with authority to review and approve covert actions before they were executed.
Declassified documents reveal what CIA officers in Santiago and Langley knew about the plot to kidnap Schneider and when they knew it. By early October 1970, both Viaux and Valenzuela had made clear to their CIA contacts that Schneider's removal was a necessary first step in any coup scenario. The CIA did not suggest kidnapping Schneider — that idea originated with the Chilean conspirators — but Agency officers understood that providing material support to coup plotters who intended to remove Schneider made the CIA complicit in that plan.
CIA cables from October 1970 show that headquarters was increasingly concerned about the operational risks. The October 16 cable withdrawing support from Viaux cited worries about "flap potential" — intelligence jargon for the risk that a failed operation would become public and create political consequences. But the cable did not order the retrieval of weapons previously supplied, and it did not terminate contact with Valenzuela's parallel conspiracy, which received $50,000 and three more submachine guns three days later.
The question of whether Viaux's group or Valenzuela's group carried out the October 22 attack has been subject to debate. The Chilean judicial investigation concluded that Viaux was the organizer and that the weapons used matched those previously supplied by the CIA. However, whether Valenzuela's group coordinated with Viaux, or whether the two conspiracies remained separate, has never been definitively resolved. What is documented is that both groups had received CIA weapons by October 22, and that the weapons used in the attack matched the CIA-supplied type.
Roberto Viaux was arrested, tried, and convicted of organizing Schneider's murder. He received a 20-year prison sentence. He served only two years. After the September 11, 1973 coup that brought General Augusto Pinochet to power, Viaux was released and granted amnesty. Other participants in the kidnapping plot also received short sentences or were not prosecuted.
General Camilo Valenzuela was not charged in connection with Schneider's death, though his conspiracy to kidnap Schneider was documented by the Church Committee. After Pinochet's coup, Valenzuela continued to serve in the Chilean military. The Pinochet regime had no interest in prosecuting the conspirators who had attempted the same goal — overthrowing Allende — that Pinochet eventually accomplished.
In the United States, no CIA officer was prosecuted for involvement in Track II or Schneider's death. The Church Committee's investigation was focused on institutional reform and congressional oversight, not criminal accountability. CIA Director Richard Helms faced consequences years later — not for Chile, but for lying to Congress. In 1977, Helms pleaded no contest to charges of failing to testify "fully and completely" before Congress about CIA activities in Chile. He received a suspended sentence and a $2,000 fine. He maintained that he was protecting classified sources and methods.
The failure of Track II in October 1970 did not end US covert operations against Allende. Track I political and economic warfare continued throughout Allende's presidency. The Nixon administration worked to undermine Chile's economy, blocked international loans, and funded opposition media and political parties. The CIA maintained contact with Chilean military officers opposed to Allende, including a rising officer named Augusto Pinochet.
On September 11, 1973 — nearly three years after Schneider's murder — the Chilean military overthrew Salvador Allende in a coordinated coup. Allende died during the assault on the presidential palace. Pinochet emerged as the leader of the military junta and established a dictatorship that lasted until 1990. The coup resulted in an estimated 3,000 deaths and disappearances and the torture of tens of thousands.
Declassified State Department and CIA documents show that US officials were briefed in advance about the planning for the 1973 coup and that the Nixon administration provided tacit support. While the documentary record does not show that the CIA organized the 1973 coup the way it attempted to organize the 1970 coup, it shows that US officials knew the coup was coming and chose not to discourage it. Within hours of Allende's death, the United States recognized the Pinochet junta.
The documentary evidence for Track II comes primarily from declassified CIA cables, Richard Helms's handwritten notes, Church Committee testimony, and Chilean judicial records. Taken together, these sources establish the basic facts: Nixon ordered the CIA to prevent Allende from taking office, the CIA funded and armed coup conspirators who planned to kidnap Schneider, those conspirators attacked Schneider using CIA-supplied weapons, Schneider died, and the coup failed.
What the documents do not definitively establish is the degree of operational control the CIA maintained over the conspirators' day-to-day actions. The Agency provided material support and encouragement, but did individual CIA officers know that an attack was planned for October 22? Did they specifically authorize lethal force if Schneider resisted? The declassified record is incomplete on these operational details.
In 2000, the CIA released additional declassified documents related to Chile, including previously withheld operational files. However, the Agency acknowledged that "many of the documents related to Track II have been destroyed," limiting the possibility of complete historical reconstruction. The Church Committee had reached the same conclusion in 1975: key operational records were either destroyed or never created, following the CIA's practice of conducting sensitive operations with minimal paper trails.
The legacy of Track II extends beyond Chile. The operation became a case study in the dangers of covert action conducted without congressional oversight. It demonstrated that presidentially authorized covert operations, when implemented through a parallel chain of command that excluded normal policy coordination, could produce catastrophic unintended consequences. And it showed that covert support for foreign coup plotters was inherently unpredictable — the CIA could provide weapons and encouragement, but it could not control how those weapons would be used or what the political consequences would be.
General René Schneider was buried in Santiago's General Cemetery. His grave became a site of pilgrimage for Chileans who supported constitutional democracy. Under the Pinochet dictatorship, visits to his grave were sometimes monitored by security forces. After Chile's return to democracy in 1990, Schneider was posthumously honored as a defender of constitutional order. The doctrine that bears his name — that the military should remain politically neutral and subordinate to civilian authority — was enshrined in Chile's post-dictatorship democratic institutions.
The murder that was supposed to prevent Allende's presidency instead ensured it. The coup that was supposed to save Chile from Marxism instead strengthened Allende's democratic legitimacy. And the covert operation that was supposed to demonstrate American power instead demonstrated its limits. Track II failed in every measurable way — except that it established a precedent that would be repeated three years later, with devastating success.